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SPEECHES
THE MONTREAL OZONE TREATY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR GLOBAL WARMING
Ambassador Richard Elliot Benedick*
In September 1987, representatives of countries from every region of
the world reached an agreement unique in the annals of international
diplomacy-an accord which many observers had believed would be
impossible to achieve. President Reagan described this treaty as "the
result of an extraordinary process ... of international diplomacy ...
[and] a monumental achievement."'
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer1
establishes international controls on certain chemicals that destroy the
stratospheric ozone layer and aggravate the greenhouse effect. It is this
ozone layer that protects life on earth from the harmful effects of radi-
ation and which contributes to stability of the global climate. By their
action, the signatories at Montreal sounded a death knell for an impor-
tant part of the international chemical industry, with implications for
billions of dollars in investment and hundreds of thousands of jobs in
such related sectors as food, plastics, transportation, electronics, cos-
* Ambassador Benedick is currently on detail from the Department of State as
Senior Fellow of The Conservation Foundation and World Wildlife Fund. A career
diplomat, he has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for environment, health,
and natural resource issues, chief U.S. negotiator for the Montreal Protocol on protect-
ing the ozone layer, and Coordinator of Population Affairs, and has served in several
embassies abroad.
These remarks are adapted from a forthcoming book, OZONE DIPLOMACY, to be
jointly published by The Conservation Foundation and Georgetown University's Insti-
tute for the Study of Diplomacy. This address was presented at the Second North
American Conference on Preparing for Climate Change, Washington, D.C., December
7, 1988.
1. President Signs Protocol on Ozone-Depleting Substance (text of President's
statement, Apr. 5, 1988), reported in 88 DEP'T. ST. BULL, at 30 (June 1988).
2. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted and
opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
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metics, fire prevention, and health care.3 The negotiators weighed the
social and economic costs of replacing substances which contribute in
many ways to modern standards of living, against hypothetical dangers
based on analysis at the frontiers of modern science. All this was done
before there was measurable evidence either of ozone depletion or of
actual damages from increased radiation or from climate change.
At Montreal, nations agreed for the first time on a worldwide regime
for specified reductions of potentially damaging chemicals. This was
not a response to an environmental disaster, such as Chernobyl or
Seveso, but rather preventative action on a global scale. Moreover, the
treaty did not take the timid path of controlling through best available
technology, which has been a traditional accommodation to economic
interests. Rather, it boldly established firm target dates for emissions
reductions, with full knowledge that the technologies for accomplishing
these goals did not yet exist.
The Montreal Protocol was a landmark because it symbolized a fun-
damental change both in the kinds of problems facing the modern
world and in the way the international community can approach these
problems. This new generation of issues reflects the interconnectedness
of life and its natural support systems on this small planet, where local-
ized activities can have global consequences, and where dangers are
slow in developing, long-term in their effects, and not readily reversible.
The concept is not obvious: a perfume spray in Paris helps destroy an
invisible gas 6 to 30 miles above the earth, and thereby contributes to
deaths from skin cancer and extinction of species half a world distant
and several generations in the future.
While international law is relatively well equipped for dealing with
traditional transboundary environmental problems, the ozone issue rep-
resented uncharted territory in its worldwide scope, scientific uncertain-
ties, and costs and risks extending far beyond normal policymaking
time horizons. The negotiators confronted a threat which could affect
every nation and all life on earth. The consequences were potentially
disastrous, yet they could not be observed or predicted with certitude.
The Montreal Protocol is thus a global prototype for decisionmaking
under uncertainty: international consensus was forged on a balance of
probabilities, where the risks of waiting for more complete evidence
were finally deemed to be too great.
More than a year later, the events at Montreal ironically have ac-
3. See Ogden, The Montreal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to Earth's Ozone
Layer, 63 WASH. L. REV. 997, 1012 n.98 (1988) (discussing the global economic im-
pact that the Montreal Protocol will have upon the chemical industry).
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quired an air of inevitability. It all seems easy in retrospect. Some ac-
tivists have even complained that the treaty was too little and too late.
But memories are short: for the greater part of this period and even
after the actual negotiations began, many governments still had doubts
over such fundamental questions as the possible degree of future dam-
age to stratospheric ozone, the extent to which industrial products were
responsible, the prospective growth of demand for these products, the
significance of any adverse effects from ozone layer depletion, and the
length of time before critical harm might occur.
A unique international process of scientific, technical, and economic
analysis and assessment, reinforced by extensive informational and dip-
lomatic initiatives of the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) and the United States government, played an essential role in
developing the consensus for concerted international action. The ozone
accord broke new ground in its reconciliation of complicated scientific,
economic, and political factors, in its handling of long-term risks, in its
innovative provisions, and in the negotiating process itself.
Greenhouse warming is an even more complex issue than protecting
the ozone layer, with many more contributing factors, more wide-rang-
ing and uncertain consequences, and more economically painful
choices. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties, global cooperation will be
essential if efforts both to limit the magnitude and rate of temperature
rise and to adapt to the effects of climate change are to be effective.
The ozone protocol may well serve as a prototype for new diplomatic
approaches to emerging global issues such as climate change. There
was no single prime cause for the success at Montreal. Rather, it was a
combination of many key factors and events that made the agreement
possible. Analysis of these elements offers insight into a possible meth-
odology for dealing on an international level with climate change.
First, the ozone history demonstrates the importance of building sci-
entific consensus, by mobilizing the best possible scientists and the most
advanced technological resources in a cooperative international effort.
The development of a commonly accepted body of data and analysis
and the narrowing of the ranges of uncertainty were instrumental in
facilitating a political consensus among negotiating parties initially far
apart in their positions.
In the process, close collaboration between scientists and government
policymakers is crucial. This synergy contributed to the irresistible
logic of the American position on ozone and greatly strengthened the
persuasiveness of U.S. negotiators. The United States government pro-
vided substantial financial resources for the necessary scientific re-
search, and U.S. policymakers paid attention to the results. The United
1990]
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States government's negotiating stance demonstrated to other countries
that it was prepared to accept considerable near-term inconvenience for
the sake of a future good.
Second, in order to mobilize the political will of nations, public opin-
ion must be adequately informed. Here again, individual scientists and
national academies have a substantial role, but their findings must be
translated and disseminated. International organizations such as
UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), through
publications and other activities, undertook major educational efforts
on the ozone issue. Individual governments, such as Canada, Finland,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United
States, were also particularly active in keeping their own and other
countries' public opinion informed. Legislative hearings can be impor-
tant for airing scientific opinion and analyzing policy alternatives: the
United States Congress held a number of public hearings on ozone and
climate change during 1987 and 1988, 4 and the German Bundestag
convened a special commission on atmospheric issues which received
well-publicized testimony from many scientists.5
Nongovernmental organizations can also make a considerable educa-
tional contribution, as well as promote research and legislation. The
media, particularly press and television, obviously play a vital role in
bringing issues before the public, thereby stimulating political interest.
The temptation to overstate the case in order to capture public atten-
tion, however, needs to be resisted. Exaggerated claims have a way of
backfiring and providing ammunition to those who want to obstruct ac-
tion. The case for ozone protection was built step-by-step and generally
avoided invoking apocalypse. Credibility is well worth preserving, even
though it may require patience.
Third, the ozone protocol process itself offers instructive insights for
approaching other global issues. The idea of disaggregating a complex
problem is valuable: climate change, for example, has so many aspects
that it is impossible to deal with everything at once. The innovative
fact-finding process which led to the Montreal agreement-the infor-
4. See, e.g., Ozone Layer Depletion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1987); U.S. Participation in International Negotiations on Ozone Protocol:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Orgs. of the House Comm.
on Foreign Aff., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: PUBLIC HEARING ON STRATOSPHERIC PRO-
TECTION, No. A-87-20, at 12 (Jan. 7-8, 1988) (discussing the usage of CFCs and their
destructive effect on the ozone layer).
5. Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphaere, Federal Republic of Germany
Bundestag, Enquete-Kommission, Bonn (1988).
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mal scientific and economic workshops which preceded formal negotia-
tions-is relevant and replicable.
The concept of an initial framework agreement, similar to the 1985
Vienna Convention on Protecting the Ozone Layer,' is a useful model:
it permits governments to agree in principle that a problem exists and
to launch coordinated scientific research to develop further data as a
guide to policy. The next step, to correspond with the Montreal treaty,
would be individual implementing protocols on specific aspects of the
problem. It is worth noting that the ozone accord is itself an example of
a partial solution to global warming, because CFCs may contribute
twenty percent or more of the heat-trapping effect.
Fourth, the mediating function of an international organization can
be critical. UNEP's catalytic role in the events leading up to the ozone
agreement has obvious implications for the future. In the informative
and consensus-building stage, during the negotiations themselves, and
later in the protocol implementation phase, UNEP was and will remain
indispensable. A great deal of the credit for the treaty should go to the
personal efforts of the executive director of UNEP, Dr. Mostafa Tolba,
an Egyptian scientist who-I am very pleased to announce-has just
been re-elected for another four-year term. Tolba's strong presence was
a major factor, commanding respect from all sides for his commitment
and his sensitivity to national interests, particularly in the Third World.
UNEP went far beyond a traditional secretariat function: it was a
leader in mobilizing data and informing world public opinion and,
through Tolba, it was a driving force in achieving the eventual consen-
sus. It was UNEP, encouraging Third World governments which might
otherwise have had only marginal interests in participating in the pro-
.cess, that made the protocol truly global in scope. UNEP provided an
objective international forum, free from the irrelevant and time-con-
suming debates on extraneous political issues which have often marred
the work of other UN bodies. It was, in short, the very model of how a
UN agency should operate in a complex international negotiation.
Fifth, an individual country's commitment and policies can have a
profound influence on the course of an international negotiation. The
many scientific and diplomatic initiatives of the United States, rein-
forced by actions of the United States Congress, environmental groups,
and industry, were crucial in achieving the Montreal accord. Within
the European Community, the ascendency of Germany toward the end
of the process was a significant factor.
6. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted and
opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987).
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A sixth and final lesson from Montreal derives from the protocol it-
self: a dynamic and flexible instrument with many innovative features.
Based on periodic scientific, economic, and technical assessments, the
treaty can be adapted to evolving conditions. There are even provisions
for emergency meetings of parties in case of unexpected and fast-
breaking developments. The protocol is not a static solution, it is an
ongoing process.
Many of the treaty's provisions represent creative resolutions of com-
plicated equity and technical problems, which can point the way for
future protocols: the trigger mechanism for entry into force, the fixed
target dates for the reductions, the process for reopening the timetable
and reduction goals, the sensible transitional provisions for developing
countries, the two-stage voting to reflect large stakeholders' interests,
the treatment of trade and nonparties.
Montreal was not a radical treaty: it tried fairly to distribute eco-
nomic burdens and it was sensitive to special situations, and for all of
this, it should prove to be a lasting and precedent-setting model for
international cooperation.
In conclusion, we have learned that this planet is more vulnerable
than most of us had thought. Science is showing how activities of mod-
ern industrial societies, driven by consumer demands and by bur-
geoning Third World populations, can alter fragile natural balances
which are not necessarily self-correcting. The Antarctic ozone hole con-
veys a philosophical warning that the atmosphere, upon which all life
depends, is capable of surprises: there is a potential for large and unex-
pected, rather than incremental change. We can no longer pretend that
nothing is happening, or that the planet will somehow automatically
adjust itself to the billions of tons of man-made pollutants to which it is
being subjected.
Mostafa Tolba has described the Montreal Protocol as "the begin-
ning of a new era of environmental statesmanship."8 The ozone treaty
reflected a realization that nations must work together in the face of
global threats, that if some major actors do not participate, the efforts
of others will be vitiated. In the realm of international relations, there
will always be uncertainties: political, economic, scientific, psychologi-
cal. The Protocol's greatest significance may be its demonstration that
7. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, art. 2, paras. 9 and 10 (providing for
adjustment of the following variables: the ozone depletion rates for each substance,
consumption and production reduction rates for the parties, and the addition or dele-
tion of controlled substances from the Annex to the Protocol).
8. Tolba, The Ozone Agreement-And Beyond, 14 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 290
(1987).
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the international community is capable of undertaking complicated co-
operative actions in the real world of ambiguity and imperfect knowl-
edge. The Montreal Protocol can be a hopeful paradigm of an evolving
global diplomacy, one wherein sovereign nations find ways to accept
common responsibility for stewardship of the planet and for the secur-
ity of generations to come.
